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PURSUING LEGAL PLURALISM: 









The Jubilee Congress of the Commission on Legal Pluralism, that took place at the 
University of Cape Town in September 2011, celebrated thirty years of the 
Commission’s role in promoting an understanding of, and commitment to, the 
study of legal pluralism worldwide. During its existence its members have engaged 
in many debates over the subject of what constitutes legal pluralism and how it is 
to be perceived. From its very inception, at the First symposium of the 
Commission on Folk Law and Legal Pluralism in Bellagio, Italy, in 1981 there 
was heated discussion about what to call law other than state law and how to 
identify its characteristics.1 Such debates continue today, and my paper seeks to 
highlight some arenas in which contestations over law and legal pluralism have 
particular salience. Thus my paper will not provide an historical account of the 
development of legal pluralism that is addressed elsewhere.2 Nor will it provide 
                                         
1 Terms such as local, folk, customary, informal, people’s law and indigenous law 
were all proposed, but the point was made that there is no characterization that 
consistently follows any supposed distinction between state and folk law. For 
details of this discussion refer to Allott and Woodman (1985: 13-20).  
2 For discussion of some key texts see Vanderlinden (1970, 1989); J. Griffiths 
(1986); Merry (1988); F. von Benda-Beckmann (1998); Woodman (1998); 
Tamanaha (1993) and A. Griffiths (2002). 
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comprehensive coverage of what legal pluralism entails.3 Instead, it seeks to 
highlight a number of domains in which the highly mobile and contingent nature of 
law is revealed, through the ways in which law is spatialized, representing multi-
faceted dimensions of legal pluralism that are constantly in the making. Such a 
vision is at odds with the more traditional views of legal pluralism that are framed 
in terms of a state centred paradigm.  
 
In recent years the power of law in all its dimensions has come under scrutiny in 
attempts to comprehend the forms that it adopts in processes of globalization. The 
growing recognition of the importance of transnational forms of law and ordering, 
derived from diverse sources (F. von Benda-Beckmann et al. 2009a, 2009b; 
Hellum et al. 2010),4 has focused attention on the plurality of law and promoted a 
new, or renewed interest in legal pluralism in an age where law and legal 
institutions cross local, regional and national boundaries. This interest is one in 
which the ‘local’ is embedded in and shaped by regional, national and international 
networks of power and information that have increasingly engaged with discourses 
on international human rights. As a concept, legal pluralism has generated great 
controversy over the years5, as different actors have used it for different purposes 
in attempts to promote their diverse interests.6 It has been invoked to uphold 
notions of authority and legitimacy, to favour or promote one set of legal claims 
over another, or to validate and acknowledge the existence of alternative or co-
existing forms of legal ordering within a particular domain.  
 
                                         
3 For examples of what the field may encompass see Greenhouse (1998); Rouland 
(1994); Tie (1999); K. von Benda-Beckmann (2001); Roberts (2005); Michaels 
(2005); Berman (2007); A. Griffiths (2009a); Tamanaha (2008) and Twining 
(2009-2010). 
4 Such sources include the World Bank, the European Convention on Human 
Rights, the World Trade Organisation, the World Health Organisation, the 
International Monetary Fund, the African Union as well as religious movements.  
5 For discussion of these debates see A. Griffiths (2002, 2009a). 
6 Such interests have been represented and debated in terms of the weak and strong 
legal models that have historically dominated discussions on pluralism, 
representing “the product of differing historical, economic and political factors that 
have conjoined to create different sites for study over time and space” (A. 
Griffiths 2002: 289). 
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Such pursuits raise questions about who has the power to make or remake law in 
all its various manifestations and for whose benefit. For how law is perceived 
depends upon the models or paradigms that are applied to its recognition that may 
vary according to the differing methodological and epistemological approaches that 
underpin them. These play a crucial role in formulating matters of jurisdiction, 
creating and ascribing authority and legitimacy that have an impact upon the 
success or failure of claims that people and institutions pursue. At whatever level 
they occur, the fate of these claims depends upon the extent to which they concur 
or are congruent with dominant legal models that are being applied. For if they fail 
to meet the standards that these models promote, these claims will be ignored or 
excluded from the arena in which they seek to operate. In the past, with the rise of 
the nation-state a particular paradigm of law became predominant, one in which 
state law acquired jurisdiction and took precedence over other forms of ordering 
within a territorially, bounded, geographic space.7  
 
Always subject to contestation, this state law model requires reformulation in the 
light of what Sassen has termed “the epochal transformation we call globalization” 
(Sassen 2008: 2), reflected today in the trans-nationalisation of personal, 
economic, communicative and religious relations that give rise to conditions of 
legal flux. Such processes, in which local, national and international regulatory 
domains are enmeshed, reconfigure law both within the nation-state and beyond its 
boundaries. While law has always been mobile and globalization of law is not a 
new phenomenon (F. von Benda-Beckmann et al. 2005), there is intensification 
and increasing density in the flows and patterns of interactions and inter-
connectedness between states and societies that constitute the modern world 
community. These incorporate global and regional networks of activity, 
institutions, and regimes of governance, as well as transnational social movements 
and other kinds of transnational association. The actors engaged in these concerns 
not only include national states acting as sovereign law makers or in concert with 
other states in the construction of international law, but also national or 
transnational nongovernmental organizations, ‘law merchants,’8 epistemic 
                                         
7 This model of law is often referred to as a positivist or legal centralist paradigm. 
For more detail on its characteristics see A. Griffiths (1997: 29-38). 
8 These are lawyers who travel the world, usually on behalf of governments, 
development organizations or multinational law firms, to introduce their law to 
countries that are in the process of legal reform; see Dezalay and Garth (1996). 
For the implications that such activities have for the development of transnational 
justice see Dezalay and Garth (2012). 
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communities,9 self-regulatory networks, traditional and religious authorities and 
local communities.  
 
Their activities range widely; from negotiating border disputes, entry to the EU, 
sponsoring aid for development, to participants in anti globalization protests, 
activists promoting the interests and human rights of indigenous or ethnic 
minorities, experts creating blueprints for governance of industries such as 
fisheries, as well as the work of religious and traditional leaders dealing with 
disputes among their followers, or local actors engaged in regulating pursuits 
within their neighbourhoods. What is clear is that all the claims being invoked 
involve space – physical, territorial, imagined, symbolic - and that the spaces they 
inhabit are multi layered. Pursuing legal pluralism in these contexts raises 
questions of scale and projection concerning the range and scope of the 
investigation, that are in turn dependent upon the standpoint from which legal 
pluralism is being addressed. For what you look for defines what you see.10 Thus, 
any analysis of legal pluralism requires to be explicit about a) who the actors are; 
b) the purposes for which legal pluralism is being invoked; and c) the sources and 
methodological approaches that inform the legal inquiry that is at stake.11 
                                         
9 See Wiber (2005), who uses this term to refer to a network of persons spread 
across the globe who share and promote a particular form of knowledge. See also 
Haas (1992); Maher (2002). 
10 The work of Drummond (2006) discussed later in this paper challenges, for 
example, the grand narratives of comparative law by exploring perceptions of 
locality and community that are discursively and historically constructed through a 
study of marriage practices in Gitano communities. What she renders visible 
would be rendered invisible under a conventional paradigm of comparative law.  
11 For as the 2009 report of the International Council for Human Rights Policy 
makes clear, given the complex constellation of factors that are at work, there can 
be no single paradigm of law that is applicable to the regulation of human rights, 
as there are no straight forward prescriptions that can be employed on a universal 
basis (ICHRP 2009). For a discussion of human rights that rejects a holistic or 
universalist stance in favour of a perception of culture that reflects a “sociological 
fiction, a shorthand referring to the disordered social field of connected practices 
and beliefs which are produced out of social action”, see Cowan et al. (2001:14). 
See also Goodale who observes that given the diversity and multiple meanings of 
human rights it is important to pay attention “to different discursive spaces in 
which transnational human rights networks are constituted” (Goodale 2007: 24). 
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Repositioning Governance: Multi Spatial Contextualizations of Law 
 
One consequence of the processes outlined above is a recharacterization of 
international law that has arisen through the rise of global problems and the 
emergence of non-state actors.12 As a result international law can no longer 
“simply coordinate state interests, but rather must facilitate state and non-state 
cooperation in such areas as humanitarian intervention, promotion of democracy 
and the rule of law, and transnational accountability” (Koh 2002: 328). Thus 
international law becomes a form of transnational law that is a subject in its own 
right as “in time the domestic and the international will become so integrated that 
we will no longer know whether to characterize certain concepts as quintessentially 
local or global in nature” (Koh 2002: 328). This is because in contexts where 
patterns of global legal interactions erode the boundaries between domestic and 
international law, foreign and domestic legal systems and practices, as well as 
internal and external juridical authorities (F. von Benda-Beckmann et al. 2005: 
2009a; 2009b; Hellum et al. 2010), the idea of a single site of sovereignty 
embodied in the nation-state cannot be sustained, although states seek to lay claim 
to this power not only at a rhetorical or ideological level, but also in practice.13 
 
 
Multi-Sited Ethnography  
 
Acknowledging these intersections requires exploring chains of interaction 
connecting transnational and local actors in multi-sited arenas. Such an approach is 
                                         
12 This has repercussion where professionals, for example, draw selectively on the 
laws of multiple jurisdictions to create transnational legal constructs to meet their 
business clients’ needs in ways that may subvert national regulations designed to 
thwart the public interests (McBarnet 2002). It raises questions about the ethics 
and viability of corporate social responsibility (McBarnet et al. 2007). It also has 
implications for the delivery of aid through international development agencies and 
NGOs that acquire ‘quasi-state status’, and that may undermine the prevailing legal 
and political orders in recipient countries (Weilenmann 2009). 
13 For an examples of the way in which a state may claim the opposite, and 
disclaim sovereignty to excuse itself from its failure to carry out its obligations to 
its citizens see Randeria (2003) on the ‘cunning’ state of India and its claims to 
powerlessness in the case of conditions imposed on development aid by the World 
Bank.  
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in keeping with anthropological and social scientific perspectives on law that 
engage with ethnography and have expanded its scope to become ‘multi-sited’ 
(Marcus 1995) or deterritorialized (Gupta and Ferguson 1992; Lefebvre 1991; 
Appadurai 1996, 2003; Merry 2006). This has opened up new horizons for study 
(A. Griffiths 2009b). The kind of multi-sited research that is called for today 
involves a broad landscape, one that encompasses not only diverse spaces 
unconfined by conventional territorial or geographic markers (Drummond 2006), 
but also such areas as ‘information flows’ encompassing the internet and global 
conferences (Merry 2000: 131) or world media (Eide 2010) in its diaspora. 
 
 
A Perspective on Migrants 
 
One area where multi-sited ethnography is especially pertinent is in addressing 
research on migration and in following the trajectories of migrants’ multi-sited 
lives. For the transnationalisation of law across national boundaries is not the 
exclusive domain of powerful inter- and trans-national actors, but also pertains to 
ordinary migrants, businessmen and traders who do not belong to the political and 
intellectual elite that feature so prominently in discussions on globalization of law. 
The literature on migration usually describes one aspect of these processes: 
migrants taking their law to the new country of domicile. This involves the 
customary or religious law of their place of origin, as well as (to some extent) 
their national law that does not lose its relevance for migrants after they have 
arrived in their new domicile. This law is usually seen as opposing the law of the 
receiving national state, creating a host of problems for politicians, lawyers and 
for the migrants (Foblets 2005).  
 
In these processes migrants are important actors in the dynamic reconfigurations of 
law at the different localities with which they are involved. What happens in one 
of the localities may have important implications for the way law develops in the 
other localities. However, the changes may occur at different paces and have 
different results depending on the specifics of the various localities involved. 
Nuijten (2005), for example focuses on the experience of migrants who move back 
and forth between La Canoa, a rural village in Western Mexico, and the USA. She 
explores contrasting normative values that migrants are confronted with in their 
transnational existence and which, in the process of confrontation and reflection, 
transform their identities. As Rabo observes in her study of Syrian transnational 
families and family law, exploring intersections cannot only be understood in 
terms of differing legal systems or laws that collide, but requires an understanding 
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of how “people actually practise family relations across national borders” (Rabo 
2010: 31).14 From another perspective, that of ethnographic research carried out in 
Germany, the USA and Haiti, Glick Schiller (2005) makes the case for a new 
category of citizenship for migrants, that of ‘transborder citizenship” that explicitly 





What has emerged from adopting these approaches to legal pluralism is a less clear 
cut ‘top down’, or ‘bottom up’ perspective - that is linear and mono-causal or 
centric in its orientation – in favour of one that is multi-dimensional and 
polycentric in nature and that encompasses networks or webs of relations. In 
exploring these dimensions, that some scholars refer to as pathways (A. Griffiths 
2009b) or trails (Greenhouse 2009), there is a recognition that what constitutes 
knowledge or understanding of these domains is not a given but is always partial 
and contingent. This standpoint is consonant with an interpretive and reflexive 
form of anthropology that explores how knowledge is produced and represented 
(Clifford and Marcus 1986; Clifford 1988; Harraway 1991; Hastrup 1992; Marcus 
and Fisher 1989; Okely 1992; Ong 1996; Wolf 1996; Yang 1996). For knowledge 
“is not transcendental, but is situated, negotiated and part of an on-going 
process…[that] spans personal, professional and cultural domains” (Narayan 1997: 
37). Such reflexivity in relation to the construction of knowledge and its 
application may be contrasted with law’s claims, under models of legal positivism 
or centralism, to authenticity and exclusivity.  
 
 
The Contingency of Knowledge: Deciphering Law 
 
An example of how such an approach challenges state centred perspectives on law 
is provided by Drummond (2006). In her investigation of family law in the city of 
Jerez in Spain, she refers to her research as a “voyage” that forms part of an 
“itinerary” (Drummond 2006: 4). This represents a conscious strategy on her part 
to provide the reader with different points of orientation to the material, bringing 
different perspectives to bear on a set of interrelated themes dealing with state, 
                                         
14 This is in tune with Drummond (2006) in critiquing approaches to comparative 
law that promote grand narratives that operate to exclude other visions of law.  
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culture and marriage that form the three chapters of the book. By presenting 
several perspectives from which law might be viewed the author aims to bring 
“various projections of law” more clearly into view thus allowing for “some of 
law’s itineraries (in the sense of both agenda and trajectory)” to “emerge in a 
place-neutralizing world “(Drummond 2006: 6). As a result of this type of analysis 
Drummond challenges the grand narratives of comparative law that adopt a linear 
overview of legal development in Europe emphasising “the convergence and 
harmonisation of legal traditions” (Drummond 2006: 18). This has involved 
interpreting the spread of secular family law across Europe with no-fault divorce 
regimes as representing “the apex of a modernising homogeneity” (Drummond 
2006: 86) in which the “culture and practice of family law in Spain” is seen to be 
“in conformity with a single, Western, globally disseminated ‘modern’ model” 
(Drummond 2006: 47). Yet, as Drummond points out, "such a rendering of the 
history of marriage in Western Europe is one that has been written as though there 
is one Western family about which a single history can be written” (Drummond 
2006: 188). As a consequence, what is represented as universal in fact represents 
“an exclusive and extraordinarily narrow band of the European population” 
(Drummond 2006:188). 
 
By focusing on space and place in the form of the city of Jerez de la Frontera 
Drummond explores what constitutes the ‘local’ or ‘locale’ through an analysis of 
perceptions of locality and community that are discursively and historically 
constructed, rather than treating it as a given. This perception is one that is not 
bounded by state notions of territoriality or jurisdiction. This approach is also in 
keeping with a shift in anthropological perceptions of space in physical or material 
terms to an interest in the spatial dimensions of culture (Gupta and Ferguson 1997) 
through the recognition “that all behaviour is located in and constructed of space” 
(Low and Zuniga 2003:1). The locale that forms the subject matter of 
Drummond’s study is not just a place where things happen but represents “a 
specific site in which social relations are bounded and locally constituted, while the 
sense of place relates to the experiences and representational map constructed of a 
specific place by its occupants” (Blomley 1994: 112). Thus for her the concept of 
‘place’ is “the central analytical problematic of the book”, which encompasses the 
actual city as well as the “metaphorical city of the book’s theoretical musings” 
(Drummond 2006: 4). Such musings are in keeping with Lefebvre’s observations 
that “space is not a scientific object removed from ideology or politics, it has 
always been political and strategic” (Lefebvre 1991: 31). In this way Drummond’s 
study, although located in a place that is a physical space, nonetheless represents a 
form of deterritorialized ethnography 
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Remapping Legal Pluralism 
 
Delineating place and space in this way has implications for the ways in which law 
and legal pluralism may be perceived. Through scholars’ ethnographic approaches 
to the study of law, based on specific, concrete and lived-experiences, other 
narratives emerge that provide a counterpoint to the analyses of law based on 
abstract legal theory. While there has been a recognition of the need to rethink the 
traditional doctrine of the sources of law (Teubner 1997) such reappraisal does not 
mark a new development, as such challenges to doctrine have long been articulated 
by scholars who view state law as representing only one form of political 
organisation that exists alongside other local, territorial, tribal, political or 
religious organizations with their own forms of law. In many cases these 
challenges to ‘traditional doctrine’ involve a study of law from below that explores 
specific responses to globalization from local perspectives. They explore spatial 
and temporal dimensions of the globalization of law, tracing the emergence, flow 
and influence of transnational legal forms into small-scale social fields. These may 
be lower levels of state administration, or villages, or social fields and arenas 
interconnecting actors at different levels of political organization. Such studies 
contribute to a growing body of research on the globalization of law in social fields 
or levels of state administration that exist below the national arena.15  
 
 
Reconfiguring States: Citizenship 
 
One area where state centred views of law have been heavily contested is that of 
citizenship. Over the years it has been the focus of much attention, given 
transnational migration discussed earlier and the displacement of persons from 
countries of origin due to wars or conflicts that have forced individuals to become 
refugees or asylum seekers. In dealing with the classification of persons, 
citizenship raises questions about defining who is to be included as a citizen within 
a state and who is to be excluded from this status. The scope of the concept of 
citizen is limited by policies implemented in formal laws, leading to a set of 
criteria applied in making this decision,16 along with bureaucratic regulatory 
                                         
15 See Stewart (2011) on plural governance chains molding constructions of gender 
in ways that lead to the unequal distribution of the benefits of globalization. 
16 For the complexities involved in determining formal choice of law questions and 
dual citizenship see Foblets (2005). 
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institutions that implement them (Morgan 2003). Those that fail to meet the criteria 
and who remain in the state acquire an “illegal” status in law rendering them liable 
to deportation and expulsion (De Genova 2002). The formal criteria for citizenship 
tend to be somewhat narrow, based on country of birth, marriage, official 
residence and so on, and have been subject to critique (Coutin 2000).  
 
Attempts have been made to displace the status quo by framing a category of 
“social citizenship” as a step towards challenging and broadening formal, legal 
definitions of citizenship when it comes to dealing with undocumented persons 
within a nation state. Such new criteria include, period of de facto residence, 
contributions to and engagement with the local community, birth of children within 
the country, among other factors (Coutin 2000). It comes as no surprise that many 
of those constructing categories of social citizenship tend to be anthropologists, 
sociologists and socio-legal scholars who have a more social-scientific perspective 
on law and its relationship with society and who seek to apply this perspective to 
create more inclusive definitions of law.  
  
Other examples include regulatory frameworks that are not formally recognised by 
state law but that have legitimacy and authority in the eyes of those communities 
that apply them. This, for example, includes the favellas in Brazil or the barrios of 
Columbia, which were viewed until recently as illegal, squatter settlements by 
state law. In recent years attempts have been made in Columbia to recognise and 
regularise some of these settlements under certain conditions. Another example is 
that of People’s Courts in South Africa that sprang up under the old apartheid 
regime with no formal legal status but used by local groups to control and regulate 
life in the townships. 
 
 
Indigenous Peoples: Strategies for Recognition 
 
Another arena of contestation in recent years has been the recognition of 
indigenous peoples and their laws and rights to self-governance. It has provided an 
ongoing focus for legal pluralism research and has had ramifications through 
inquiries into how the concept of indigeneity is constructed within local, national 
and transnational domains. Merry has long observed that “indigenous groups often 
define themselves in terms being developed by the global movement of indigenous 
peoples human rights and the provision of state law” (Merry 2000: 127). This is 
important because “the legal provision of the nation in which an indigenous 
community lives as well as those of the international order affect how a particular 





- 183 – 
 
indigenous community presents itself and the kinds of identities it assumes” 
(Merry 2000: 127). These represent in part “accommodations to the shifting global 
and national frameworks of power and meaning in which the community lives” 
(Merry 2000: 127).  
 
Early strategies for recognition adopted different means. The strategy behind the 
Mabo case17 in Australia, for example, was to make the national legal system 
recognize native title, demonstrating that indigenous laws, customs and traditions, 
could be accommodated within the Common Law paradigm. While native title 
could be extinguished in a number of ways, the decision opened up the way for 
indigenous groups to claim interest in large segments of their traditional lands if 
they could demonstrate the required continuing connection with those lands. In 
contrast, the WAI 262 proceedings in New Zealand18 dealing with the issue of 
folklore protection alleged, amongst other things, that the Crown, by entering into 
a number of key intellectual property law instruments without proper consultation 
with the Maori, breached its obligations under the treaty of Waitangi. The 
claimants starting point in these proceedings was not the traditional taxonomy of 
intellectual property rights and a demonstration of how the concerns of the Maori 
Iwi could be accommodated within the traditional heuristic structure of intellectual 
property law, but rather the treaty of Waitangi and its guarantee of the right to 
sovereignty which they claimed the Crown had breached. 
 
 
Tribal Constitutionalism: Towards a New Form of Pluralism 
 
In responding to claims and rights asserted by indigenous peoples, states such as 
Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United States have required such peoples 
to adopt a written constitution on membership rules. Such rules operate as a 
condition of official recognition. This requirement has given rise to ‘tribal 
constitutionalism’ that generates a new legal and political distinction between 
indigeneity and tribal membership (Gover 2010). This creates “a jurisdictional 
split between the category of indigenous persons identified by the state, and the 
category of tribal members identified by officially recognized tribes” (Gover 2010: 
1). This is problematic because these classifications create a situation where some 
                                         
17 Mabo v Queensland [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1. For discussion see Sackville 
(2003). 
18 For discussion see Austin (2003). 
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“legally indigenous persons are not tribal members” while “some tribal members 
would not qualify as indigenous under public law definitions” (Gover 2010: 1). In 
the settler states she deals with, Gover observes that one of two models are applied 
to recognition based on race or the nation (Gover 2010:10). The first model, based 
on race, prioritises indigenous ancestry, while the second, based on the nation, 
prioritises tribal membership. They operate in opposition to one another with the 
effect that “either tribal self-governance is undermined by the State’s dealing with 
non-tribal indigenous people, or a large and growing number of indigenous people 
are shut out of the State-indigenous relationship by the mediating institutions of 
tribes” (Gover 2010: 10).  
 
Yet, Gover argues, the concept of indigeneity extends beyond that of a narrowly 
construed emphasis on tribal membership, for many non-tribal persons are 
recognized by tribes and by other indigenous communities. This is something of 
which neither model of recognition takes account because “neither acknowledges 
the role played by indigenous communities in the construction of indigeneity” 
(Gover 2010: 10). In accommodating this excluded perspective, Gover advocates 
adopting a concept of ‘inter-indigenous’ recognition. This would extend the legal 
category of ‘public indigeneity’ beyond members of officially recognized tribes to 
include “the cultural concept [of indigneity] as it emerges from indigenous 
practices of recognition” (Gover 2010: 10).  
 
 
Moving Beyond the State: Appeals to Transnational Regulation 
 
Defining concepts of indigeneity, involving recognition of membership within 
social groups and of rights ascribed to their status, entails configuring relations 
between indigenous peoples and states. This not only involves internal processes of 
negotiation located within the geographic territories of states but may also involve 
appeals to transnational forms of governance that may be used to reshape 
negotiations within these arenas. For example, UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP)19 provides an international instrument that may be 
utilized by indigenous peoples in the quest for recognition and implementation of 
international human rights standards to legitimate their claims on states. Framed in 
terms of international law, UNDRIP refers to international law norms, human 
                                         
19 This was passed by a resolution of the General Assembly, GA Res 61/295, 
adopted on 13th September 2007. 
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rights law, treaties between states and indigenous peoples, state law, and without 
distinction, to indigenous ‘laws, traditions [and] customs’. As such, it marks a 
significant advance in the recognition of indigenous peoples as subjects of 
international law, with recognition of their collective rights that may be viewed as 
separate and distinct from the body of international human rights law (geared to 
individual rights) and the related rights of minorities. As a resolution, UNDRIP is 
not a treaty establishing international obligations for those states that consented to 
its adoption. Nonetheless, it has provided an important mechanism for developing 
a system of global governance and international human rights law. As Wheatley 
observes “applications from indigenous groups have been important in developing 
the ‘case law’ of the Human Rights Committee on Article 27, International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the minority right to a distinctive ‘way of 
life’)” (Wheatley 2009: 383).  
 
What UNDRIP creates is space for “political participation in legal regimes outside 
of the state” that “allows the possibility of regime capture (or at least influence) 
with the authority of the international law system then seen to conflict with the 
state law system” (Wheatley 2009: 383). In appealing to norms developed outside 
state legal systems, indigenous peoples may challenge legal norms within their 
own domestic legal systems. This gives rise to a legal pluralism that requires a 
“shift in the thinking of public international lawyers.” They must make sense of 
the “new complexities” and take account of “global governance, and the relevance 
of democracy and democratic legitimacy in the exercise of political authority”, 
including a recognition of the social, economic and political life of indigenous 
peoples (Wheatley 2009: 384). 
 
Outside of states, bodies that may be used to push the implementation of human 
rights within states include the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
(IACHR) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights that regulate the Inter-
American Human Rights System. A recent case, La Oraya Community v Peru, 
pursues the relationship between environmental health and human rights. It seeks 
to extend the responsibility of a state for the violation of human rights of a non-
indigenous community through contamination of the environment. As Spieler 
observes the case is significant because it “has the potential to expand the concept 
that environmental protection is closely related to human rights promotion and 
effectiveness” (Spieler 2010: 27). If the IACHR issues a report in favour of the 
petitioners, the people of La Oroya, and the state of Peru fails to address the 
concerns of the IACHR it could remit the case to the Inter-American Court. While 
the Court has issued judgments dealing with environmental degradation, these 
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have, to date, been confined to dealing with indigenous communities and the 
protection of their rights and territories. In opening up the scope for recognition of 
the interrelationship between environmental health and human rights in general, 
the case has the potential for holding a state accountable for human rights 
violations in a broader arena. This could include violations of the right to health, 
life or personal integrity of a community, caused by environmental contamination 
in a whole range of circumstances, such as pesticide contamination, or air 
pollution in cities (Spieler 2010: 23). 
 
 
Mobilizing Legal Change: Social Movements and Constitutional Reform 
 
Mobilizing for change within states is not confined to the struggles of indigenous 
peoples. It can involve widespread political mobilization for radical legal reform as 
in the case of several Latin American countries (Houtzager 2005; Restrepo 
Amariles 2010). In his study, Houtzager examines the impact of social movements 
in challenging systemic and durable forms of exclusion. In his case, in the context 
of the struggle for land engaged in by the Movement of the Landless (MST) in 
Brazil. He analyses the success of the MST, that has made access to land more 
equitable in parts of Brazil by redefining property rights in practice, in terms of 
juridical mobilization through the juridical field. This field is constituted through a 
wide range of actors and institutions including judges and judicial institutions, 
private lawyers and law firms, public prosecutors, law school professors, NGOs 
and professional legal associations. Such mobilization takes places across multiple 
fields that “integrate juridical action into broader political mobilization, 
politicizing struggles before they become juridified, and mobilizing sophisticated 
legal skills from diverse actors” (Houtzager 2005: 219). In addition, support was 
also garnered from other sources that were “religious (through the progressive 
wing of the Catholic Church and pastoral organizations), political (through the 
Workers’ Party in particular), labor (through the labor organization Central Unica 
dos Trabalhadores), academic, and within international advocacy groups and 
NGOs” (Houtzager 2005: 225). Such support was set in motion because of the 
transition to democracy.  
 
What Houtzager demonstrates is how substantial legal change may be generated 
“when dynamics in the movement field and the political arena converged to alter 
that of the juridical field” (Houtzager 2005: 220). Even where this does not occur 
he shows how change on a smaller and more incremental scale can be brought 
about through mobilization across multiple fields. In these processes the modalities 
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of legal change may vary. Drawing on the case of land occupation Pontal do 
Paranapanema, he demonstrates how the movement’s land occupation strategy and 
juridical mobilization can combine to set in motion different types of modalities of 
legal change. In Pontal do Paranapanema three modalities were visible, these were 
“[1] state enforcement of a de jure legality that was ignored in practice, [2] a 
significant procedural innovation that speeded up the judicial clock, and [3] a shift 
in the sources of law and reinterpretation of substantive legal norms” (Houtzager 
2005: 225).  
 
Underpinning these developments is recognition that ever since the 1990’s the 
efforts to constitutionalise law have played a critical role in facilitating judicial 
modalities of legal change. Such efforts have been strengthened through networks 
of progressive lawyers, especially the National Network of Popular Lawyers, 
formally constituted in 1996. Their commitment to the constitutionalisation process 
within the juridical field “played an important role in synchronizing the juridical 
and movement fields” (Houtzager 2005: 237). It has “played a substantial role in 
altering a highly exclusionary legality by compelling public authorities to 
implement existing agrarian reform legislation, by helping to create and 
institutionalize novel interpretations of the social function of property and an 
expanded notion of civil disobedience” (Houtzager 2005: 238). What is key in this 
process is an understanding of the dialectical relationship existing between the 
movement and juridical fields that illuminates how “relations between fields can 
alter their respective internal logics” to mobilize new perspectives on law 
(Houtzager 2005: 223). 
 
Turning to other parts of Latin America, Restrepo Amariles draws attention to 
constitutional change in Columbia (1991), Venezuela (1999) and Bolivia (2009), 
focused on popular sovereignty as a means of refounding the state (Restrepo 
Amariles 2010). Promoted by the Latin American neo-constitutional movement 
and its radical wing, constitutional reforms in these countries aim at 
institutionalising popular sovereignty – based on legitimacy – over legal 
sovereignty – founded on legality, in the foundation, structure and functioning of 
the state. What this entails is establishing “original constituent powers” derived 
from the people, the promotion of active political participation and a focus on the 
justiciability of constitutional rights. To this end, and in order to include minorities 
and historically excluded groups in the process of constitutional reform, Columbia 
established a constitutional assembly. This was derived out of a national consensus 
“that claimed for itself the original constituent power” and thus “the legitimate 
constitutional power of the Columbian State” (Restrepo Amariles 2010: 89). 
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According to Restrepo Amariles the constitutional assembly was characterised by 
its legitimacy rather than by its legality because it was “a constituent power and 
not a constituted power”. It was “a source of law because it was built upon 
popular sovereignty” (Restrepo Amariles 2010: 89). 
 
Venezuela went further than Columbia in its mechanisms for participation by 
holding a referendum on whether or not to establish a constitutional assembly, and 
by presenting the final draft of the constitution prepared by it to the people for 
approbation in another referendum. The Venezuelan Constitution “established by 
the sovereign people – in exercise of their constituent power” (Restrepo Amariles 
2010: 95) constructed an institutional arrangement of that state that allows for 
permanent popular participation through creating a new public electoral power. 
This independent electoral power was established to enable citizens to control state 
abuses. It does so by guaranteeing the expression of the people’s sovereignty 
“through vote, referendum, consultation of public opinion, mandate revocation” 
and other mechanisms as well as “open forums and meetings of citizens whose 
decisions are binding’ (Restrepo Amariles 2010: 98). What is key here is the 
potential for strengthening civil society organisations and social networks of co-
operation without the intermediation of political parties. The electoral power 
promotes a direct link among citizens and between citizens and the state.  
 
To strengthen this type of participation the Columbian Constitution provides 
another mechanism for assuring popular legitimacy in the functioning of the state. 
This is through provision for the justiciability of constitutional fundamental rights 
that allow for “actualizing rather than merely protecting these constitutional 
rights” (Restrepo Amariles 2010: 104).20 In this process the Constitutional Court 
“has used judicial review not only to decide particular cases, but to advance the 
social agenda of the constitution and promote structural changes that eliminate 
permanent threats to fundamental rights” (Restrepo Amariles 2010: 110). Restrepo 
Amariles  argues further that with the introduction of constitutional actions for the 
actualisation of fundamental rights “constitutional review becomes more than an 
instrument of legality; it becomes a means of achieving popular legitimacy for the 
state” (Restrepo Amariles 2010: 113). This is especially the case given that it is 
not only negative liberty rights that are protected by the constitutional judges but 
also positive rights, such as housing, work and social security that increase “the 
                                         
20 This is done through four different types of constitutional actions, the fulfillment 
action (Art 87); the popular action (Art 88); the group action (Art 88) and the 
Tutela action (Art 86). For details see Restrepo Amariles (2010: 104-112).  
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legitimizing potential of constitutional review” (Restrepo Amariles 2010: 113).  
 
These processes underpin broader notions of legitimacy with regard to state 
policies and actions, as well as providing for greater popular participation in the 
affairs of state through the development of a concept of popular sovereignty.21 As 
such these developments represent radical changes in the interpretive legal process 
as well as in the accountability of the state that is expanded through constitutional 
reform. To be successful they require concerted political action and convergence 




Virtual Worlds and Ephemeral Domains: New Horizons on Law 
 
Rethinking questions of authority and legitimacy with regard to law also arise in 
spaces that elude conventional approaches to doctrinal analysis. One such arena 
concerns the internet. Given its global reach there has been much discussion over 
the years as to whom should regulate it, what form this regulation should take and 
for what purposes. Such deliberations give rise to competing approaches to 
perceptions of what the ‘global commons’ entails in a virtual world (Bernstorff 
2004; Dizon 2010; Paliwala 2010). Much of the discussion centres on the potential 
for democratic governance and the ways in which this may be ordered. For Dizon 
the flaws in popular theories of democracy and Information and Communications 
Technology (ICT), be they utopian, dystopian or reinforcement, derive from the 
fact that “they have a very limited and singular view of what democracy is, where 
to look for it, and who are involved in its constitution” (Dizon 2010: 7). For this 
reason he advocates the need to “deconstruct and re-imagine the conception of 
democracy itself beyond the traditionalist state-centred and legal centralist 
assumptions” (Dizon 2010: 7). He proposes to do this by expanding the concept 
“beyond governmental regulation and political activity” which allows for “a 
                                         
21 Restrepo Amariles however challenges the view put forward by the radical wing 
of the neo constitutionalist movement, that popular sovereignty has replaced legal 
sovereignty underlying the modern political project by producing an alternative 
refoundation project. He argues that the latter is in fact “essentially a way of 
recovering the faith in modern ideals…[by creating] a new ideological artifact of 
modern thought aiming to recover faith in itself” (Restrepo Amariles 2010: 124-
125). 
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broader yet more socially-intimate and fine grained experience of democracy” to 
be comprehended  (Dizon 2010: 9).  
 
Another approach is adopted by Paliwala who explores the way cyberspace’s 
construction of new internet cultures also transforms economic and regulatory 
cultures that compete with one another (Paliwala 2010). On the one hand, he draw 
attention to cyberspace’s potential for creating a new space for collaborative, non-
capitalist, democratic engagement that is emancipatory for its constituents or the 
‘multitude’. However, he also highlights a competing approach that seeks to 
defend state and property interests by harnessing the power of capital to develop 
and control new modes of regulation and production with their inclusionary and 
exclusionary powers. What emerges are contradictory interpretations of what 
virtual space embodies. Thus Baxi and others such as Klein and Rajan stress that 
far from being emancipatory the internet represents new techno-scientific modes of 
production that stand for new modes of domination (Baxi 2006; Klein 2005: Rajan 
2006).  
 
From yet another perspective, Ali examines the discourse of internet fatwa and 
how this affects women and gender relations in a transnational sphere (Ali 2010). 
In exploring selected fatwas from three internet sites she asks the question 
“whether this burgeoning field of communication reflects emerging discursive sites 
for Muslim women within a counter-hegemonic transnational and global ‘virtual’ 
space” (Ali 2011: 118). In addressing this issue her study reveals how these new 
cyber space regulation mechanisms serve global Muslim space. As such, they 
generate an international discourse encompassing a wide spectrum of interacting 
norms that highlight “the ‘irrepressible’ plurality of the Islamic tradition” (Ali 
2011: 118). She demonstrates how these sites have enabled Muslim women to 
raise questions about their lives that “they would not have been able to frame in a 
‘face to face’ encounter due to the sensitive, private and at time challenging nature 
of the enquiry” (Ali 2011: 118). Thus she highlights the transformative potential of 
internet fatwas and the implications that this has for transnational and international 
family law norms within plural Islamic legal traditions. Her approach challenges 
existing hegemonies within an Islamic tradition that is predicated upon ethnicity, 
schools of juristic thought and territorial locations.  
 
Moving in and out of engagements with multi-sited, transnational arenas poses 
problems about how to study a world in which all “is in flux, order is transient, 
nothing is independent, everything relates to everything else, and no one 
subsystem is necessarily continuously in charge” (Martin 1994: 250). It is a 
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problem at the other end of the scale from deriving law and order from the 
territorial and sovereign claims of nation-states. While anthropological and/or 
social-scientific approaches to law have provided alternative visions of legal 
pluralism from those based on state centred frameworks, this has generally been 
accomplished through ethnographic and empirical studies derived from a focus on 
the “field” as a locus of study. What this entails has been subject to change over 
time, from earlier studies of village life to multi-sited or deterritorialised 
ethnography discussed earlier. It is constantly undergoing reconceptualisation and 
adapting to new challenges, as for example, how to conduct research where there 
is no easily discernible ‘social field’. This is most evident in, but not confined to, 
moments of political reconstruction and instability (Greenhouse, Mertz and Warren 
2002).  
 
An example of the challenges this poses is provided by Zabusky’s study of space-
science mission development in Europe (Zabusky 2002). In examining the worlds 
of big science and European integration Zabusky elected to study the Space 
Science Department (SSD), within the European Space Research and Technology 
Centre located in the Netherlands, where most of the technical and scientific work 
is carried out. Zabusky identified what she considered to be a manageable social 
field for study, one where staff scientists are responsible for co-ordinating the 
efforts of other scientists, engineers and technicians from across Europe in 
designing, developing and manufacturing European Space Agency space-science 
missions. However, it soon became clear that the SSD “was not a relevant …even 
genuine, social field for European scientists” (Zabusky 2002: 125), so she 
reoriented her focus away from the SSD itself to space-science missions. But this 
also presented difficulties because there was no central locus of decision-making 
that could be grasped, or tangible space that presented itself for study.  
 
Instead, she encountered ephemeral virtual networks, such as international review 
boards that “did not exist anywhere but appeared only at the moment when called 
into being by a set of rules and regulations and by ongoing practices of 
participants” (Zabusky 2002: 129). For staff participating in mission development 
this gave rise to a sense of vulnerability and uncertainty in a world where 
“networks of people in different locations” working “toward a common goal” 
were continually being made and unmade “in decision-making processes that were 
constantly taking on different forms, subject to shifting centres of power that in 
turn dissolved and became reconstituted elsewhere” (Zabusky 2002:125). The 
problem for Zabuksy was that these processes “seemed more defined by constant 
change than by definitive structures; at every moment, political, economic, and 
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organizational realities shifted”; this challenged Zabusky’s ability “to hone in on a 
place I could call the field” (Zabusky 2002: 115). These experiences raised 
questions about where was “Europe (as opposed to its constituent nation-states)?”, 
along with the problems of identifying “the international scientific community” 
since it was, by definition, everywhere?” (Zabusky 2002: 121). Nonetheless, she 
continued to grapple with these processes that she viewed as “widening gyres” 
where no-one is in control of this ongoing “gyration” that involves “the making 
and unmaking of centres” (Zabusky 2002: 113).  
 
In exposing and exploring these dimensions Zabusky reveals how productivity in 
space-science mission development, far from being the product of political 
stability, in fact results from “participants experiences of instability and 
uncertainty as they improvise moments of clarity in which work can get done” 
(Zabusky 2002: 114). For participants working at the intersection of two powerful 
transnational processes, European integration and big science, this is an uphill 
struggle, as they are faced with constructing missions in the light of forces that are 
often at odds with one another. They must “meet their professional or intellectual 
needs” that are required for their projects “in the face of constant shifts in political 
priorities, organisational policies, and economic real-locations over which they 
have little or no control” (Zabusky 2002: 114). Under such circumstances what 
becomes apparent is the contingent and highly mobile nature of the world in which 
space-science missions come into being.22  
 
 
Shifting Paradigms: Legal Pluralism and the Mobilization of Power 
 
This paper has explored forms of legal pluralism that highlight the multi-spatial 
contextualization of law. It provides a perspective on legal pluralism that highlights 
the mobile and contingent nature of law that reflects an ongoing process. Thus it 
challenges conventional analyses of law that are centred on and derive from a state 
centred perspective. It demonstrates the multiple ways in which international, 
transnational, national and local domains intersect with one another in a whole 
variety of ways that undermine any grand narrative of globalization and 
concomitant vision of law. It displaces the latter, that underpins discussions of a 
uniform tendency towards homogenization, or alternatively, to fragmentation in 
                                         
22 See Brumann (2012) on the importance of engaging in a discursive ethnography 
of interaction in studying the World Heritage arena.  
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the globalization literature, by highlighting the ways in which the effects of 
globalization reveal themselves to be highly different in specific contexts. This is 
accomplished through an analysis that sets out the complex relationships derived 
from intersections between transnational forms of law, such as human rights and 
religious law, and local legal orders, such as customary or traditional law, 
emanating from a plurality of sources within and beyond the state. 
 
The importance of this perspective on law is that it reconstitutes spaces for action 
and the redrawing of boundaries within an environment in which state sources of 
law represent only one of a number of elements that may be at work. It also 
reveals the multi-stranded composition of state legal pluralism that discloses more 
shifting alliances and transitory bases for action.23 In addition, it makes visible the 
transformative potential for law that derives from the new kinds of political and 
legal spaces that are in the making, that elude the boundaries of the territorial state 
and traditional legal scholarship. Such an approach reframes the discussion of 
institutions and specific practices – both public and private- “away from 
historically shaped national logics” (Sassen 2008: 2). Such visibility is critical for 
acquiring a proper understanding of processes of gloablization that, among other 
things, are “taking place inside the national to a far larger extent than is usually 
recognized” (Sassen 2008: 1). 
 
In pursuing this form of analysis an understanding of the ways in which law is 
spatialized becomes apparent. It demonstrates how legal representation of space 
must be seen “as constituted by – and in turn, constituted of – complex, 
normatively charged and often competing vision of social and political life under 
law” (Blomley 1994: xi). In struggling to make sense of the complexity and 
ambiguity of social life “legal agents – whether judges, legal theorists, 
administrative officers or ordinary people – represent and evaluate space in 
different ways” (Blomley 1994: xi). What is foregrounded under plural legal 
conditions are the diverse and often contradictory notions of spaces and boundaries 
or borderlands that come to exist. In acknowledging these diverse legal 
constructions that come into being, what becomes visible the “multiple arenas for 
                                         
23 Merry and Woodman have long called for the need for a more serious 
investigation into what state legal pluralism involves, to examine the nation-state’s 
ideological claims to legal uniformity and coherence that are used to construct a 
meta narrative that challenges “other” forms of ordering (Merry 1988; Woodman 
1998). Studies on governance and governmentality have contributed to dismantling 
this image (Griffiths 2009a; Zips and Weilenmann 2011). 
JOURNAL OF LEGAL PLURALISM 




  - 194 – 
 
the exercise of political authority, the localization of rights and obligations, as well 
as the creation of social relationships and institutions that are characterized by 
different degrees of abstractions, different temporalities and moral connotations” 
(F. von Benda-Beckmann et al. 2009b: 4). 
 
What emerges from these more broadly construed perspectives on law are the 
different actors who are engaged in contestations over who has the power and 
authority to generate law and construct its meaning. This is especially pertinent in 
plural legal constellations where there may be contestation over what is the 
‘correct’ law in particular contexts. The power struggles that emerge under these 
circumstances often reflect asymmetrical power relations among parties and among 
legal orders. This affects the ways in which law’s legitimacy is constituted and 
reconstructed. For law plays an important part in creating, producing and 
enforcing meanings of concepts such as ‘justice’, ‘authority’ and ‘rights’, and in 
instantiating notions of ‘legality’ that may be invoked by different social actors in 
their construction of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic discourses. Such 
discourses not only operate on a rhetorical or ideological level but may also serve 
to underpin the actual use of force or violence to achieve their ends.24  
 
The recognition and prioritizing of legal orders today continues to create dilemmas 
and opportunities for contestation. These are ongoing because of a lack of 
consensus on how relationships between competing legal orders are to be 
determined. This involves questions about the extent to which such orders can co-
exist, or the conditions under which one law takes precedence over another. In 
these negotiations legal pluralism provides a repertoire on which social actors can 
draw in constructing discourses of legitimacy that may be used to promote and 
justify multiple forms of intervention, action and policy-making in many different 
arenas. This is so, whether it is utilized to provide a form of higher legitimacy 
derived from rhetorical claims or whether it is mobilized for more concrete and 
instrumental purposes. Comprehending what these dimensions entail engages with 
the multifaceted nature of law that constitutes legal pluralism. It also underlines the 
extent to which legal spaces are embedded in broader social and political claims 
that involve complex negotiations over power25 that cannot be ignored. 
                                         
24 See Baxi (2009), Greenhouse (2009) and Nader (2009) on the power of legal 
discourse in the ‘war on terror’. 
25 For discussion of the multiple dimensions that power embodies see F. von 
Benda-Beckmann et al. (2009a: 2-6). 
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